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WHAT CAN WE LEARN ABOUT 
ROMANTIC LOVE FROM HARRY 
FRANKFURT’S ACCOUNT OF LOVE?
Natasha McKeever
arry Frankfurt outlines a comprehensive and at times compelling 
account of love in several of his works, perhaps most notably in The 
Reasons of Love. However, he does not think that romantic love fits the 
ideal of love:
Relationships that are primarily romantic or sexual do not provide very 
authentic or illuminating paradigms of love as I am construing it. Rela-
tionships of those kinds typically include a number of vividly distracting 
elements, which do not belong to the essential nature of love as a mode of 
disinterested concern, but that are so confusing that they make it nearly 
impossible for anyone to be clear about just what is going on.1
In this paper, I argue that we can, nonetheless, learn some important things 
about romantic love from his account. I will suggest, conversely, that there is 
distinct value in romantic love, which derives from the nature of the relationship 
on which it is based.
The structure of this paper will be as follows. I will first outline Frankfurt’s 
“four main conceptually necessary features of love of any variety.” These are:
(i) Love “consists most basically in a disinterested concern for the 
well-being or flourishing of the person who is loved.”
(ii) Love is “ineluctably personal.”
(iii) “The lover identifies with his beloved.”
(iv) “Love is not a matter of choice.”2
After this exposition I will consider Frankfurt’s theory as applied specifically to 
romantic love. I will then critically analyze Frankfurt’s four necessary features of 
love as applied to romantic love. Finally, I will argue that Frankfurt fails to appre-
1 Frankfurt, The Reasons of Love, 43.
2 Frankfurt, The Reasons of Love, 79–80.
H
 Frankfurt and Romantic Love 205
ciate the distinct value of romantic love, which is not less valuable than parental 
love, just valuable in a different way.
1. Love According to Frankfurt
Frankfurt writes that there are “four main conceptually necessary features of love 
of any variety.”3 In this section I will briefly explain each feature; I will return to 
them later to discuss problems with them as features of romantic love.
(i) Love “consists most basically in a disinterested concern for the 
well-being or flourishing of the person who is loved.”4 
According to Frankfurt, the only interest of the lover is to serve and promote the 
well-being of the beloved, and so to love someone for the hope of personal gain 
is not real love. The beloved is a Kantian “end in itself ”; a “final end” in Frank-
furt’s words. Love requires valuing its object as an end rather than a means. So if 
Josie loves Jason for his money, she does not really love him at all, as her concern 
for him is really a self-interested concern for wealth. She cares for him only as a 
means by which to improve her own life, not for his well-being in itself. To love, 
Frankfurtian style, one must “forget oneself ” and give love to the beloved “as a 
gift,” as Gary Foster puts it.5 
Frankfurt acknowledges that an objection might be that love cannot be en-
tirely disinterested because “the beloved provides the lover with an essential 
condition for achieving an end—loving—that is intrinsically important to him.”6 
Frankfurt thinks that love is necessary to enjoy living. Therefore, loving could be 
construed as self-interested because the beloved provides a means to prevent the 
lover from living without love. However, Frankfurt does not think this presents a 
problem for his view because the lover can only accrue the benefits of loving by 
loving disinterestedly: “what serves the self-interest of the lover is nothing other 
than his selflessness.”7 Although loving the beloved may serve the lover’s desire 
to love, she can do this only by being selflessly devoted to the beloved. 
3 Frankfurt, The Reasons of Love, 79.
4 Note that in this phrase Frankfurt says that love is for persons, yet elsewhere he writes about 
love for objects, places, ideas, etc. I raise the objection later about whether love, as Frankfurt 
construes it, can just be for people. 
5 Foster, “Romantic Love and Knowledge,” 239.
6 Frankfurt, The Reasons of Love, 59.
7 Frankfurt, The Reasons of Love, 61.
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(ii) Love is “ineluctably personal.”
One might think that a disinterested concern for the beloved is really agape, a 
selfless, unconditional love for humanity. However, Frankfurt emphasizes that 
the kind of love in which he is interested is the love for irreplaceable individuals, 
not “instances of a type.”8 Thus, if she really loves Jason, Josie must love him as 
the particular person he is, not because he is a political activist with a good sense 
of humor. Furthermore, if she loves him, she would not love a substitute.9 If she 
met Jason’s even funnier and more politically active brother, Jerry, she would 
not just dump Jason in favor of Jerry. Even an identical duplicate of Jason would 
not do. 
This links to Frankfurt’s rejection of the “appraisal model” of love. He eluci-
dates what it means to love something as a particular in his essay “On Caring”: 
The reason is that he loves it in its essentially irreproducible concreteness. 
The focus of a person’s love is not those general and hence repeatable 
characteristics that make his beloved describable. Rather, it is the specific 
particularity that makes his beloved nameable—something that is more 
mysterious than describability, and that is in any case manifestly impos-
sible to define.10
What makes something or someone nameable is simply what makes them dis-
tinct from others; but this distinctiveness does not depend on their charac-
teristics. I would still be the discrete entity I am if I lost my memory and my 
personality and appearance changed completely, though I would share few char-
acteristics with my former self. Indeed, if a stranger was given two descriptions 
of me, one as I am now, and one from when I was 1 day old, they probably would 
not think the descriptions were of the same person. However, the “nameable” 
part of me is the same; it is just my “describable” bit that is different. Similarly, 
a duplicate of me would share my “describable” bit, but not my “nameable” bit. 
My characteristics are irrelevant to my nameability, though they are what make 
me describable. Therefore, if we love people on the basis of their nameability 
rather than their describability, we are unable to articulate the reasons for loving 
them beyond saying “because they are them.” A rationalist account of love, on 
the other hand, focuses on the describable; if asked “why do you love her?” the 
rationalist would respond with a description of the beloved. 
8 Frankfurt, The Reasons of Love, 80.
9 Frankfurt, The Reasons of Love, 46.
10 Frankfurt, “On Caring,” 170.
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(iii) “The lover identifies with his beloved.”
To identify with someone, you take their interests as your own. When they 
achieve success, you share in their joy; when they suffer a loss, you share in their 
misery. This helps to explain how love is more than just disinterested concern or 
caring. When I give money to a homeless person because I care about her suffer-
ing I may be (if I do not gain anything from the transaction) showing disinter-
ested concern for her. However, I do not take her interests as my own; indeed I 
might completely put her out of my mind after I have made the donation. There-
fore, my motivation for giving the money is not love, as construed by Frankfurt. 
This links to Frankfurt’s second feature of love, since you can only identify with a 
person or a thing if they are a particular, rather than merely an instance of a type. 
When I give money to the homeless person, it might be that I am giving money 
to her because I want to give to a homeless person, rather than to her in particu-
lar. My concern is for “the homeless”; any homeless person would have done just 
as well. In such a case, my motivation is disinterested concern for the homeless, 
but it is not love because it is not personal and does not involve identification. 
Incidentally, identification seems to conflict with Frankfurt’s first feature, 
that love is disinterested concern. This is because, in a way, the lover has expand-
ed her interests: taking the beloved’s interests as her own could be construed as 
simply acquiring more interests and thus more opportunity to acquire benefits. 
Josie wants good things to happen to Jason, in part, because this will make her 
happy. I return to this point later on. 
(iv) “Love is not a matter of choice.”
For Frankfurt, “love is not a matter of choice but is determined by conditions 
that are outside our immediate voluntary control.”11 This is, for Frankfurt, a nec-
essary feature of love and caring. He argues that if we did not accept that caring 
was outside of our voluntary control, we would be unable to explain why we 
cannot just stop caring about something merely at will, why it imposes a kind 
of necessity upon us.12 He argues that caring about something imposes a “vo-
litional necessity” on us. A volitional necessity differs from a causal or logical 
necessity in that it does not limit our physical power to be able to do X; rather, 
it limits our will, making it impossible to bring oneself to do X.13 For example, a 
wife of a serial killer might find that she just cannot bring herself to stop loving 
her husband even though she finds his actions unconscionable. This impossibil-
11 Frankfurt, The Reasons of Love, 80.
12 Frankfurt, The Importance of What We Care About, 88.
13 Frankfurt, The Importance of What We Care About, 86.
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ity is a volitional necessity, though not a causal or logical one. She knows that 
she could stop loving him, and believes that she ought to, but she cannot make 
herself want to do this enough to actually do it. Indeed, in order to be able to 
bring ourselves to make a change in our lives, we have to change what we care 
about; for example, I will not become thinner until I care more about being slim 
than about eating cake.
However, Frankfurt argues that the imposition of volitional necessities does 
not make love an infringement on our autonomy, since although we cannot 
choose what we love or how that love will make us want to act, the constraints 
on our choices are our own; they both constitute and are created by our will.14 
Thus, love is involuntary in the sense that we cannot consciously bring it about 
or stop it, but it is not like an unwanted addiction. Rather, love is intertwined 
with our will: “since love is itself a configuration of the will, it cannot be true of 
a person who does genuinely love something that his love is entirely involun-
tary.”15 What does Frankfurt mean by “a configuration of the will?” In an earlier 
essay, “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person,” Frankfurt explains in 
detail how an action or emotion can be outside of our immediate control yet still 
be a product of our free will. He explains the concept of second-order desires, 
which are the desires to have or not to have other desires, and of second-order 
volitions, which are the desires for desires to be one’s will or for other desires to 
be effective or ineffective.16 For example, consider a woman who wants to want 
to perform an act of kindness for her child but is also angry with him for being 
naughty; she has conflicting first-order desires: to be kind to her child and to 
teach him a lesson. Perhaps she is experiencing a second-order desire to want 
to be kind to her child, but she has a second-order volition that this desire be 
ineffective. She will not be content until all of these desires become aligned. The 
configuration of the will is the arrangement of one’s second-order desires and 
volitions, which are outside of one’s direct control but that create and influence 
one’s first-order desires, and it is love that makes up our configuration. Thus love 
is involuntary in a sense, but voluntary in a more important way: it underlies 
what voluntary choices we can make. 
When we are wholehearted we identify with the configuration of our will and 
do not try to change our first-order desires or have conflicting ones. “[Whole-
hearted love] expresses what we, as active individuals, cannot help being. . . . 
Moreover, wholehearted love expresses—beyond that—what we cannot help 
14 Frankfurt, The Reasons of Love, 46.
15 Frankfurt, Necessity, Volition and Love, 137.
16 Frankfurt, “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person,” 12–13, 16. 
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wholeheartedly wanting to be.”17 When we act wholeheartedly we experience 
ourselves as acting freely. Thus, the woman who genuinely feels no anger or re-
sentment toward her naughty child, but only the wholehearted desire to be kind 
to him because of her wholehearted love for him, will experience her kindness 
toward him as a free action.
To sum up, love is involuntary in the sense that one cannot make oneself love 
or not love another merely by willing it be so.18 This is because we cannot con-
trol our second-order desires and volitions; but this does not make love invol-
untary or make us unfree in the way that heroin addiction does. There is a more 
important conception of voluntariness that does not just mean being totally un-
constrained, but rather means identifying with one’s second-order desires and 
volitions. When one does this, one acts wholeheartedly and Frankfurt thinks 
that wholeheartedness is, ceteris paribus, more desirable than ambivalence.19 It is, 
therefore, something toward which we ought to aim.
In the next part of this paper, I consider Frankfurt’s views applied to romantic 
love. I begin with why we might think Frankfurt’s theory fits common concep-
tions of romantic love and then consider some problems we encounter when 
applying it to romantic love.
2. Frankfurt and Romantic Love
There is a commonly held intuition that love is reasonless, arational, out of our 
control, that it can just take hold of us, leaving us resolutely in its grasp. This 
intuition is most widely written about and discussed with relation to romantic 
love; though other kinds of love—familial love and friendship, for example—
can feel reasonless too. Indeed, love for objects, places, and pieces of art can all 
feel arational. This intuition supports Frankfurt’s theory as it suggests that the 
claim that love need not have reasons is true. As my main focus is on romantic 
love, I will discuss the apparent arationality of romantic love. First, we might 
note, as John Shand and many others have, that we use the phrase to “fall in love,” 
which implies “a non-rational event one is subject to and does not deliberately, 
let alone rationally, control.”20 Once a person has begun to fall it does not make 
sense to ask them to stop, however good one’s reasons may be. There are at least 
two further sources of evidence for the intuition that love is reasonless: (a) we 
often find it difficult, if not impossible, to explain the reasons why we love people, 
17 Frankfurt, “Taking Ourselves Seriously,” 51.
18 Frankfurt, “Taking Ourselves Seriously,” 41.
19 Frankfurt, “Reply to Susan Wolf,” 250.
20 Shand, “Love As If,” 7.
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and (b) it is nearly impossible to persuade someone to love or not to love anoth-
er. I will now consider each of these in turn.
2.1. Explaining the Reasons for Love
We often have trouble explaining the reasons why we love someone and some-
times find it inappropriate to ask a person why they love another.21 Robert 
Solomon notes that “most people are quite incoherent if not speechless about 
producing reasons for loving a particular person.”22 To respond to the question 
“Why do you love him?” with “I just do” or “I know how I feel” is an often-heard 
and seemingly reasonable reply.23 Indeed, to answer the question with a list of 
the person’s qualities could imply that you do not really understand what love is 
or that you do not really love her. Shand makes an even stronger claim: “starting 
to give or even consider reasons for loving someone, and certainly presenting 
them to the beloved, may be seen as proof that one does not love them.”24 This 
might be too strong, but if your partner told you they were trying to work out 
the reasons why they loved you, you might reasonably take this to mean that 
they are unsure whether they love you at all. Conversely, to answer the question 
“Why do you hate her?” or “Why do you admire her?” with “I don’t know, I just 
do” seems inappropriate and unreasonable. As Alan Soble highlights, “‘agapic’ 
hate looks pathological, and we would help someone experiencing it to get over 
it.”25 We expect people to be able to give reasons for admiring and hating others 
and, if they do not, we tend to think that they do not understand what it means 
to admire or hate another. Thus, love seems to be a different kind of emotional 
response to a person than these more reasoned responses.
2.2. Persuading to Love or Not to Love
In addition, we cannot be persuaded (via rational argument) to love someone 
or to stop loving them, whereas it does seem possible to persuade someone to 
admire or dislike another. I might say, “You should admire Jemma because she’s 
intelligent, thoughtful, has great values, and has made it all on her own,” and 
there is at least some chance that you will agree. However, I cannot persuade 
you to love her. This is, in part at least, because love does not seem to respond to 
21 We might ask a similar question: “What do you love about her?” But the response this seems 
to be anticipating is more along the lines of: “What qualities of hers do you appreciate?”
22 Solomon, “Reasons for Love,” 12.
23 Shand, “Love As If,” 6.
24 Shand, “Love As If,” 7.
25 Soble, review of The Reasons of Love, 6. Note that Soble also thinks that agapic love is patho-
logical as he compares agapic hate with agapic love.
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reasons in the way that other emotional responses to people do. I might suggest 
that you try to fall in love with a mutual friend who has many qualities I know 
you value, but I know that the most I could persuade you to do would be to 
spend time with her and try to get to know her. Indeed, many people have had 
the experience of really wanting, but failing, to feel romantic love for someone, 
perhaps their spouse whom they no longer love or a friend whom they know 
would make a great romantic partner. Ty Landrum notes that
the compulsion to intimacy is not something that one can simply call up 
or discipline oneself to achieve. . . . A normative demand to feel the com-
pulsion of intimacy toward persons for whom one simply does not feel 
that compulsion is an absurd demand.26 
Further, though we sometimes try to persuade our friends and family not to love 
those whom we believe to be wrong for them, we seldom succeed. I may think 
that it is very unfortunate that you love your aggressive and dishonest wife and 
suggest that you remove yourself from a relationship with her, but even if I suc-
ceed in persuading you to leave the relationship, I cannot stop you from loving 
her. This is because your desire to continue loving her is, in Frankfurt’s terms, a 
second-order desire that you cannot directly control. Solomon observes that “it 
is by now a trite movie scene, where the protagonist writes down in one column 
fifty reasons why he should leave his lover, and then in the other column simply 
writes ‘I love her!’—and that clinches the decision.”27 Part of the reason you can-
not be persuaded not to love your wife is because the simple fact that you do love 
her seems to override all the other reasons that I could give you not to love her. 
Frankfurt’s view can easily explain this seeming irrationality: you can see all the 
reasons not to love her, but nonetheless you continue to love her because your 
love for her is not a matter of choice. Your love is not irrational, but arational; it 
is beyond the scope of reasons.
Frankfurt’s distinction between the nameable and the describable is a pos-
sible way of illuminating the unexplainable element of love. Both of the above 
observations—that we find it difficult to explain the reasons why we love the 
people we do and why it is almost impossible to persuade someone to love 
another—seem to imply that love is not based on the describable aspects of a 
person as other responses to people’s perceived value are, such as admiration or 
hatred. It is not usually difficult to explain why we admire or hate someone be-
cause we can simply respond with a list of the qualities of the person that justify 
the attitude toward her. In other words, we can describe the admirable or hateful 
26 Landrum, “Persons as Objects of Love,” 420.
27 Solomon, “Reasons for Love,” 11.
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features of that person and this will be sufficient to explain our feelings about 
her. Admiration and hatred are responses to the appraised value of the object. 
On the other hand, we tend to feel that no description of a person could fully 
account for why we love them. As Shand points out, although when trying to 
explain why I love my beloved I may begin by describing them, in the end I will 
feel that my description provides an insufficient explanation and l will have to 
say that I “just do” love them.28 As explained earlier, the “nameable” aspect of a 
person is something over and above the totality of their properties, so if we love 
people for their nameability, no description of them will be able to fully account 
for the love. In addition, Frankfurt’s distinction between first- and second-order 
desires and volitions provides another answer to the question of why love seems 
mysterious. If love is a configuration of our second-order desires and volitions 
then it is outside of our immediate cognitive understanding and control.
3. What Can Frankfurt’s Four Necessary 
Features of Love Tell Us about Romantic Love?
In this section I return to Frankfurt’s “four conceptually necessary features of 
love” and consider problems with them as features of romantic love in particular. 
Frankfurt would probably agree with me on some of the points I make, since he 
is clear that the kind of love in which he is interested is not romantic. However, 
my reason for analyzing these features in relation to romantic love is to show 
two things. First, I want to show that there are different kinds of love, and, in 
particular, that romantic love is a distinct kind of love. Second, I hope to show 
that romantic love is no less valuable than other kinds of love, though Frankfurt 
implies that it is. I will remain agnostic about how well his theory works for other 
kinds of love.
(i) Love “consists most basically in a disinterested concern for the 
well-being or flourishing of the person who is loved.”
It is a key feature of Frankfurtian love that it is selfless and disinterested. The 
beloved must be loved for her own sake, not because the lover will gain anything 
through loving her. However, romantic lovers do tend to benefit from their love 
and the benefit the love gives them is part of their reason for loving. If loving 
consists in caring for the well-being of the beloved and wanting to contribute 
to it, then the lover will be happy when the beloved is happy, since her loving 
desires have been fulfilled. This means that serving the beloved’s interests neces-
sarily serves the self-interest of the lover. Indeed, this seems to be exactly what 
28 Shand, “Love As If,” 6–7.
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Frankfurt means when he says that the lover identifies with the beloved. This 
is, of course, not true only for romantic love. Parents, for example, are usually 
happy when their children are well and happy and there does not seem to be 
any problem with this. If their children’s happiness did not make them happy 
we might question whether they really loved them at all (with some exceptions, 
such as if their children were made happy by acting in a way that conflicted with 
the parents’ moral values). Nevertheless, Frankfurt could respond to this objec-
tion by reminding us that, since the lover’s aim is to serve the beloved’s needs 
disinterestedly, whether or not she is made happy through doing so is beside 
the point. 
However, romantic love is more self-interested than familial love, and per-
haps more than friendship love, because we expect more from it; we want it to 
make us happy and we demand reciprocity from it. The romantic lover is not 
usually content to love her beloved from afar; she wants to be loved back and 
she wants to be near her beloved. Indeed, knowing that one’s beloved wants to 
contribute to one’s well-being seems to provide a reason to love one’s beloved 
in return. People seek out romantic love for the reason that it will contribute to 
their own well-being and happiness. Of course, people do not have children just 
so that they can selflessly dote on them either; in most cases, parents hope that 
having children will enrich their lives. However, parents are willing to tolerate 
a lot more from their children, in some cases an unlimited amount of misery, 
before abandoning them. Romantic partners, on the other hand, are more ready 
to leave each other if the relationship no longer makes them happy.29 Even those 
who believe you should marry for life usually believe there are more circum-
stances in which it is acceptable to leave your spouse than your child. As love 
depends to an extent on the relationship, leaving a relationship with someone is 
akin to saying you no longer want to love them. Similarly, as friendship is usually 
less demanding than romantic love and more flexible, we are sometimes willing 
to tolerate more from our friends than our romantic lovers. Consequently, as 
explained earlier, Frankfurt does not think that romantic love fits the ideal of 
love that he is investigating. 
Relationships that are primarily romantic or sexual do not provide very 
authentic or illuminating paradigms of love as I am construing it. Rela-
tionships of those kinds typically include a number of vividly distracting 
elements, which do not belong to the essential nature of love as a mode of 
29 Of course, romantic love requires a degree of commitment as well though. Being ready to 
leave at the first sign of problems might indicate that you are not really in love.
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disinterested concern, but that are so confusing that they make it nearly 
impossible for anyone to be clear about just what is going on.30 
Frankfurt provides a few examples of what such “distracting elements” might be 
later in his book: “a hope to be loved in return or to acquire certain other goods 
that are distinct from the well-being of the beloved—for instance, companion-
ship, emotional and material security, sexual gratification, prestige, or the like.”31 
The suggestion is that there are self-interested desires and motivations intrinsic 
to romantic love, and these render it an impure or inauthentic kind of love. 
I agree with Frankfurt that romantic love is full of self-interested desires, but 
I argue that these are part of what gives it its distinctive value. Romantic love is 
not “wholly unaccompanied by an interest in any other good,” but we do not 
want it to be, because then it would lose its value as romantic love. The partic-
ular value of agape and parental love lies, in part, in their unconditionality and 
disinterested concern. The particular value of romantic love—and, to some ex-
tent, friendship—on the other hand, lies, in part, in its conditionality and con-
tribution to our self-interest. This is partly because of the reciprocal nature of 
romantic love. That is, even if it is unrequited, romantic love always hopes for 
reciprocation and, therefore, to receive something in return. On Frankfurt’s view, 
this makes it an inauthentic kind of love for, “love does not necessarily include a 
desire for union of any other kind. It does not entail any interest in reciprocity or 
symmetry in the relationship between lover and the beloved.”32 However, some-
one who does not even desire for their love to be returned does not romantically 
love their beloved. As Foster argues: 
We may not love someone simply because we want our love reciprocated, 
but reciprocation (at some point) or the hope of such is a necessary part 
of the development of romantic love. . . . The man who loves a woman 
who, in return, does not acknowledge his existence, can fairly be said to 
possess an illusory love.33
On the other hand, the mother who loves her son, despite him not knowing 
she exists, does not seem to possess only illusory love. Foster points out that 
for Frankfurtian love based solely on bestowal of value, reciprocation is not 
important: “the parent or the Christian God does not require reciprocation.”34 
30 Frankfurt, The Reasons of Love, 43.
31 Frankfurt, The Reasons of Love, 83.
32 Frankfurt, “Taking Ourselves Seriously,” 41.
33 Foster, “Bestowal without Appraisal,” 162.
34 Foster, “Bestowal without Appraisal,” 163.
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However, “romantic love and friendship are relational and rely on a dynamic of 
giving, receiving and sharing.”35 This is because of the nature of the relationships 
on which the love is based. Parental love and God’s love do not depend upon a 
reciprocal relationship. Romantic love and friendship, on the other hand, ideal-
ly involve love between equals and thus require a measure of give and take. Of 
course, it would be an unusual parent who did not desire that their child loved 
them back, but parents are far more likely to tolerate their children not recipro-
cating their love and continue to love them regardless than romantic lovers are.
However, although it is reasonable to desire, indeed expect, romantic love 
to make the lover happy, the lover must also care about the well-being of her 
beloved. If this was not the case, then it would not be an instance of real love, for 
the desire to care for the beloved’s well-being is a minimal requirement of love. 
Thus, although romantic love does not consist in totally disinterested concern, it 
necessarily involves caring for the beloved. Therefore, the kinds of interests that 
are served through love must be those that make the beloved happy or benefit 
her in some way too. For example, it is reasonable for Jason to love Josie, in part, 
because being with her makes him happier and feel more confident, as long as 
he cares that her being with him also makes her feel happier and more confident. 
Conversely, it does not seem like an instance of real love if your “love” for anoth-
er makes you happy but them afraid, for example if you are stalking them, even 
if stalking them makes you very happy. Therefore, to care about the well-being 
of the beloved entails wanting to be good for them and so feeling happy when 
we are good for them. We therefore want their love for us to be at least partly 
self-interested so that our aim of making them happy can be fulfilled. We want 
them to love us because loving us makes them happy and this will, in turn, serve 
our own self-interest through seeing our project—making our beloved happy—
realized. It will also serve our self-interest by boosting our self-esteem through 
having someone hold us in such high regard. This distinguishes romantic love 
from parental love: although we want our parents to hold us in high esteem, we 
tend to assume that they will continue to love us even if they cannot stand to be 
around us. 
For these reasons, romantic love consists less of disinterested concern than 
parental love. Frankfurt agrees but implies that this makes it less valuable than 
parental love, which he claims is the purest kind of love.36 I suggest, conversely, 
that the value is simply of a different kind, providing different goods to us.
35 Foster, “Bestowal without Appraisal,” 163.
36 Frankfurt: “Among relationships between humans, the love of parents for their infants or 
small children is the species of caring that comes closest to offering recognizably pure in-
stances of love” (The Reasons of Love, 43).
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(ii) Love is “ineluctably personal.”
By calling love “ineluctably personal” Frankfurt is denying that it is based on 
any “describable” features of the beloved—her properties, in other words. He 
is thus denying that appraisal features at all in love, other than perhaps by mak-
ing the lover first notice the beloved. However, if love need not result from any 
prior value of the beloved, and the value of the beloved to the lover is purely the 
value that the lover has bestowed upon them, what we love seems to be arbi-
trary. Frankfurt says that “the object of love can be almost anything” and “love 
requires no reasons and can have anything as its cause.”37 He also addresses the 
question of why we care about some things and not others, though his response 
is rather unsatisfactory as an explanation of romantic love:
It seems that it must be the fact that it is possible for him to care about 
the one and not the other, or to care about the one in a way which is 
more important to him than the way in which it is possible for him to care 
about the other. The person does not care about the object because its 
worthiness commands that he do so. On the other hand, the worthiness 
of the activity of caring commands that he choose an object which he will 
be able to care about.38
As Frankfurt describes love as a form of caring, I assume that this explanation 
covers why we love some people and not others. If so, what he says conflicts 
with how it is that we want to be loved: few would be satisfied with the answer 
to the question, “Why do you love me?” being “Because it is possible for me 
to love you and I need to love something.” Furthermore, his account implies 
that no things or people are objectively more worthy of love than others. This is 
implausible though; it is surely objectively true that my child is more worthy of 
my love than my alarm clock, but for Frankfurt, I could bestow as much value 
on the clock as I could on anything or anyone else and thus could love it more 
than my child without doing anything objectionable. However, this seems false: 
a parent who loved an alarm clock more than their child would seem to be in 
need of either chastisement or help; we would not just leave them to it. This 
shows that there must be at least some reasons for love and that these reasons 
must be at least partly based on the qualities of the beloved. As Niko Kolodny 
explains, even if we cannot decide to love by weighing up reasons, it does not 
follow that there are no normative reasons for love. He compares love to belief: 
we cannot always just decide what to believe, but this does not entail that there 
37 Frankfurt, “Taking Ourselves Seriously,” 40–41.
38 Frankfurt, The Importance of What We Care About, 94.
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are no normative reasons to believe X and not Y.39 As Susan Wolf notes, we have 
“an interest in living in the real world”; we do not want to be deluded. Thus, we 
have an interest in loving only things that are worthy of love.40 Furthermore, as 
Annette Baier points out, if what we care about is as important to us as Frank-
furt says it should be, and if caring involves a great deal of investment in the 
well-being of the beloved, it seems sensible to seriously consider what we should 
care about.41 Indeed, Frankfurt himself says this too, suggesting that one should 
consider whether loving something will improve one’s life.42 However, it seems 
impossible to do this if love is not justified by the properties of the beloved.43 If 
the reason for me loving X is merely that it is possible for me to love X and not 
Y, if I love X because of its nameability and not its describability, then how can I 
question whether loving X and not Y is the right thing?
Solomon agrees that the qualities of the beloved must have some role in ex-
plaining the reasons for love. He asks, “What is ‘the person,’ apart from all of his 
or her properties? A naked soul? Can one in any erotic (as opposed to agapic) 
sense love an ontologically naked, property-less soul?”44 Such a soul is difficult 
to imagine, and probably even harder to love. If the love is not based on any 
properties of the beloved, then it seems that the lover could love the beloved 
without knowing anything about them, or indeed while knowing false informa-
tion about them. Initially, we might think that this is true of parental love but 
not of friendship or romantic love. A mother might love a child she gave away at 
birth despite knowing nothing about him, or despite knowing false information 
about him. One might say that she loves him because of the “nameable” bit of 
him, not the “describable” bit. However, she does love him for something about 
him that is describable, and that is that he is her son. Thus, there is a puzzle here: 
parental love feels non-cognitive, but similarly it is not accidental that it is our 
own children that we love. 
These issues are particularly salient with regard to romantic love because 
we are generally highly selective about whom we love romantically and this se-
lectiveness gives romantic love part of its distinctive value. Being chosen from 
39 Kolodny, “Love as Valuing a Relationship,” 138.
40 Wolf, “The True, the Good, and the Lovable, 236.
41 Baier, “Caring about Caring,” 274.
42 “The question of what to care about . . . is one which must necessarily be important to him” 
(The Importance of What We Care About, 92). See also Frankfurt, “Reply to Susan Wolf,” 
246–48.
43 Soble, review of The Reasons of Love, 8.
44 Solomon, “Reasons for Love,” 7.
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others makes romantic love boost the beloved’s self-esteem.45 Derek Edyvane 
observes that
a large part of what we value about being the object of another’s love is 
that we take it to imply an informed and positive (or at least not negative), 
objective evaluation of our character, we think of love as being more than 
the arbitrary expression of a subjective whim. We want to know that there 
exist reasons that can render this person’s love for us intelligible to oth-
ers.46 
Though I do not necessarily want others to love my beloved, I want them to 
understand why I love him and not another; I want them to agree that I have 
chosen the right person to love. In other words, I want my love to be justifiable 
to others.47 Furthermore, we want to be loved by someone who has chosen us 
and finds that choice intelligible. We do not want to be loved simply because it 
was possible for the lover to love us. To be loved by someone who could love 
someone whatever their properties are carries far less significance, and less value, 
than being loved by someone who loves us on the basis of our individual char-
acter. While we accept that our parents would have loved any child they had had 
as much as they love us, we want our romantic partners to love us because of 
what we are like. Foster highlights a common objection to the view that people 
are loved on the basis of their properties: that someone with the same prop-
erties could be loved just as much. However, if love is not based on properties 
at all, and the value of the beloved to the lover is solely bestowed value, then 
Frankfurt’s beloved “may [too] feel that she could easily be replaced by someone 
else with very different qualities.”48 Nicholas Dixon takes this point further and 
argues that unless romantic love is based on the qualities of the beloved it is not 
love at all: “I do not love you if my love will continue no matter what you do and 
no matter how your qualities change, unless we are prepared to identify you with 
an immaterial Cartesian essence.”49 To be told that one will be loved romantical-
ly whatever one becomes, seems, as Troy Jollimore puts it, “as impersonal and 
alienating as ‘I would love anyone who had your name and social security num-
45 Keller, “How Do I Love Thee?” 167.
46 Edyvane, “Against Unconditional Love,” 72.
47 Baier makes a similar point: “It is a fairly good criterion for genuine love in Frankfurt’s sense, 
namely, a genuine instance of love—typically the lover does want others to find the loved 
one lovable” (“Caring about Caring,” 281).
48 Foster, “Romantic Love and Knowledge,” 243.
49 Dixon, “Romantic Love, Appraisal, and Commitment,” 383.
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ber.’”50 Of course, sometimes love does persist despite major changes in the be-
loved, such as after the onset of Alzheimer’s disease or a serious stroke, and when 
it does, we tend to admire the strength of the lover’s love rather than dismiss it as 
unreal. However, these are special circumstances, and might be more accurately 
described as instances of what Neil Delaney calls “loving commitment” than 
romantic love.51 
(iii) “The lover identifies with his beloved.”
Frankfurt argues that to love something means to identify with it so that its 
well-being becomes tied up with your own. For example, Josie feels happy when 
Jason gets a promotion at work, but sad when his boss belittles him in front of his 
colleagues. This is not because of the impact his happiness or sadness has on her, 
but simply because if he is unhappy then she is unhappy too because she loves 
him. This seems to be a reasonable expectation to have from love, particularly 
from romantic love. However, identification seems to be in conflict with some 
of Frankfurt’s other ideas about love—that the lover does not need to know the 
beloved and that love is disinterested. Frankfurt does not seem to take seriously 
the fact that one is best able to identify with, and thus to love, someone with 
whom one is in a close relationship, and thus, once again, he fails to recognize 
the particular value of romantic love. Identification with the beloved requires 
intimate knowledge of a person that can be acquired only through spending a 
significant amount of time with them and through sharing intimate information 
with one another. In suggesting that, “I may love a woman, with no opportunity 
to affect her in any way; and she may have no inkling that I exist,” and that “the 
beloved may be entirely unaware of the love, and may be entirely unaffected by 
it,” Frankfurt implies that one can identify with another without sharing a rela-
tionship with them or even knowing them.52
Against this claim, Bennett Helm suggests that love is “distinct from compas-
sionate concern” because in loving a particular person, “I must take an interest 
not just in his well-being but also in his identity itself, and the kind of interest 
I take in his identity must itself be deeply personal.”53 This is, in part, because 
the well-being of someone is tied up with her identity. To identify with a par-
ticular person requires that you love them “not merely as a person but as this 
50 Jollimore, Love’s Vison, 142.
51 Delaney, “Romantic Love and Loving Commitment,” 350–51. Note that this is not necessar-
ily to say that all the attitudes involved in love are reason-responsive. It could include both 
reason-responsive elements and elements that are not reason-responsive.
52 Frankfurt, “Duty and Love,” 6, and “Taking Ourselves Seriously,” 41.
53 Helm, “Love, Identification, and the Emotions,” 41.
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person, as having this particular identity.”54 There is more to being a person than 
having one’s physiological needs met. Caring for someone as a person might 
mean giving them a certain amount of respect and dignity and making sure their 
basic needs are met. Caring for someone as this person entails caring for their 
identity, and it is this that makes love for a particular person different from care 
and concern for people in general. Returning to the example of giving money to 
a homeless person: when I give money to a homeless person (whom I do not 
know personally) I feel compassionate concern for the homeless; I care about 
their suffering and I want to try and ease it. I care for the homeless as people, 
but, without detailed knowledge of their lives, values, and personalities, I cannot 
care for them as individuals, and thus I can only identify with them minimally. 
Suppose I make friends with a homeless person called Joan, though: the more I 
get to know Joan, the better I can care for her as an individual, since I can appre-
ciate and understand more and more the complexity of her needs and desires. 
It therefore becomes possible for me to love Joan, though it was not possible 
for me to love the homeless individuals to whom I gave money before but did 
not get to know. It is identification that distinguishes the love of particular peo-
ple from agape. Frankfurt seems, in his account of love, to try to unite agape, an 
unconditional love for humanity, with the love of particular people. However, 
though an omniscient god could have intimate, detailed knowledge of everyone 
in a way that allows them to care for all people as individuals, humans are far 
more limited. If we are very good, we might be able to have compassionate con-
cern for everyone, but we cannot love people we do not know because we can 
only identify with a few people.55
Frankfurt argues that love and caring involve taking on the beloved’s needs 
and desires as one’s own. In order to do this you need to share in their identity 
in some way; you need to feel that you have a stake in what happens to them. 
Romantic lovers are ideally located to do this because they share their lives and 
identities in such a way that their needs and values become intertwined with 
one another. We are wary of the notion of love at first sight, because the “lovers” 
have not had sufficient time to get to know each other. To illustrate what car-
ing for someone’s identity entails, Helm tells a story about his wife playing in a 
bagpipe competition. He suggests that he values piping, not because it is part of 
his identity, but because he shares in her identity, and thus he cannot help but 
share in the value that piping has to her. This means that he feels emotions very 
similar to what she feels during the competition: pride at winning and anxiety 
54 Helm, “Love, Identification, and the Emotions,” 46.
55 Frankfurt does distinguish love from compassion or “charitable concern” (The Reasons of 
Love, 44).
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when things do not go well. In fact, he knows her and cares for her so well that 
he feels anxious, “even when she does not recognize the impending threat to her 
identity,” such as when he is aware that other people in the audience think she is 
no good. Thus, he states, “I commit myself to the place playing bagpipes (among 
other things) has in the kind of life worth her living, and so I commit myself to 
feeling a broad pattern of other emotions focused on her and subfocused on pip-
ing.”56 Of course, we do this in other relationships as well: a parent, for instance, 
might be heavily emotionally involved with their child’s performance at a school 
concert. However, it seems that there must be some kind of intimate relation-
ship for such identification to take place, and romantic relationships are ideal for 
fostering identification.
Furthermore, as Foster points out, we need to know the beloved for as long 
as we love them and to continually renew our knowledge of them, because their 
interests will be continually evolving and changing: “We must come to know 
another person in order to be aware of her interests, but we should never let this 
knowledge become frozen so that we maintain a fixed concept of the other.”57 
Thus, for Helm to care for the well-being of his bagpiping wife fully, he needs to 
converse with her; he needs to listen to her when she explains that she secretly 
wants to lose the bagpipe competition so will play deliberately badly because she 
really wants to learn to play the flute but she does not want her bagpiping friends 
to know this. We are wary when people continue to love someone with whom 
they once had a brief relationship because their love is based on a frozen image 
of their beloved and thus the object of their love really no longer exists. As Baier 
notes, the need for constant news about the welfare of those we care about is a 
sign that we genuinely care about them.58
Paradoxically, the desires to know another, spend time with them, and have 
them share secrets with us seem to be just the kind of self-interested concerns 
that conflict with Frankfurt’s conception of love. However, these desires are 
closely aligned with the desire to care for the beloved as a particular individual. 
They are also essential for romantic love, which requires the lovers to share their 
lives in a significant way. Thus, it seems reasonable for Helm to be hurt if his 
wife does not tell him that she secretly wants to lose the bagpipe competition 
because, by not telling him, she is denying him the opportunity to identify with 
her. Due to the reciprocal nature of romantic love, if she does not want him to 
care for her, he might think that she does not care for him. Conversely, if Helm 
loves his wife in the Frankfurtian way, he should not require that his wife tell him 
56 Helm, “Love, Identification, and the Emotions,” 49.
57 Foster, “Romantic Love and Knowledge,” 246.
58 Baier, “Caring about Caring,” 274.
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anything; he should love her regardless, and he has no obligation to share things 
with her. Thus, once again, Frankfurt appears to overlook some of the distinct 
value of romantic love and one of the ways in which romantic lovers might be 
particularly well-positioned to care for each other authentically. One of the best 
ways to gain detailed knowledge of the other in a way that allows you to identify 
with them is through sharing a life together in a close, reciprocal relationship. 
(iv) “Love is not a matter of choice.”
Frankfurt argues that love is outside of our direct control; we cannot love or 
stop loving someone merely by willing it to be so. This appeals to our intuition 
about love, but on further reflection, we seem to have more direct control over 
romantic love and friendship love than familial love. This is because both roman-
tic partners and friends are chosen, and the love felt for our romantic beloveds 
and friends depends on us sharing a particular kind of relationship with them. 
Thus, as it is possible to extract oneself from these relationships, we have some 
control over whether or not the love continues, though Frankfurt is right that in 
some cases we will not be able to bring ourselves to leave the relationships. We 
do have control over whether we enter into a romantic relationship or friendship 
with another though; this distinguishes romantic love from familial love.59 We 
would not even attempt to romantically love the majority of people, based on a 
rational decision that we would not get along with them, they would be bad for 
us in some way, or simply because we are not attracted to them. 
Thus, romantic love does not just happen to us: it derives from a relationship 
that we choose to cultivate. The lover might feel that she cannot help loving her 
beloved, but whether she allows the love to develop in the first place is, to an 
extent, in her control. As Simon Keller notes, we can choose whether to “re-
sist or embrace love”: “when I find myself in love with someone, I can decide 
whether it would be better for me to send him flowers or to move to another 
city.”60 If I know someone is not right for me (perhaps they are violent or already 
have a partner), I can make the decision not to see that person anymore. At least 
during the early stages of love, many decisions are made regarding the roman-
tic relationship, even if not entirely consciously. The lover decides whether to 
spend her Friday night with her friends or her new beloved, whether to ignore 
his annoying habits or allow herself to be bothered by them, whether or not to 
open herself up to him and tell him her secrets. All of these decisions will affect 
59 A person might be able to choose whether or not to procreate, but they cannot choose what 
their children will be like so they do not choose to be in a relationship with that particular 
child.
60 Keller, “How Do I Love Thee?” 165.
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whether the first flutters of love develop into something more long-lasting and 
substantial. 
Perhaps Frankfurt would agree thus far; maybe he only believes that love is 
outside of our control once it has already taken hold of us. Nevertheless, the 
choices we have do not disappear once we are in love. The lover still has to make 
decisions that affect the relationship on which the love is based. For example, he 
can decide whether to move away for a promotion at work or stay with his be-
loved, whether to give up a drinking habit he knows she might leave him for, or 
whether to have sex with her friend who keeps flirting with him. Such decisions 
might appear not to be directly about love. The man who chooses to move away, 
continue drinking, or have sex with his partner’s friend might still love her dearly. 
However, as he knows, his decisions will affect whether and how the relation-
ship, on which their love depends, will continue and thus they are also decisions 
about the love shared between them. It is not simply a case of “if he loves her 
he’ll sacrifice the promotion.” Instead, the man faces conflicting desires and a 
choice over which he is in control; love does not simply always override all other 
reasons for action. Furthermore, he knows that he can decide to end the rela-
tionship, and that eventually he will stop loving his partner. Although it might 
be very hard to do this, if the reasons for ending the relationship outweigh the 
reasons for remaining in the relationship then he will be able to bring himself to 
leave; the limitation on his will is not total. It is not a necessity. Michael Bratman 
points out that “wholeheartedness and the absence of any intention to change 
need not involve an incapacity. That I quite sensibly would not change does not 
mean that I could not change.”61 This is evidenced by the vast numbers of peo-
ple who do end relationships despite continuing to be in love. In his defense, 
Frankfurt could claim that they are not really in love, but this would be to beg 
the question. He could also say that people who end relationships with people 
whom they love just love other things, like their work, more than their roman-
tic partners. However, even if this is true, they are still able to weigh the things 
they love and make decisions about them. In addition, it is debatable whether 
wholeheartedness, as Frankfurt construes it, is indeed always a good thing. Wolf 
reminds us that “wholeheartedness in the face or the context of objective rea-
sons for doubt, seems indistinguishable from zealotry, fanaticism, or, at the least, 
close-mindedness.”62 Wholeheartedly loving someone who continually abuses 
you is pitiable or irrational; it is not admirable. 
Frankfurt might also say that the comparative readiness we have to leave 
romantic relationships, and their being more in our control than familial love, 
61 Bratman, “A Thoughtful and Reasonable Stability,” 85.
62 Wolf, “The True, the Good, and the Lovable,” 239.
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is evidence of the lack of authenticity of romantic love. However, it might also 
be seen as evidence for the distinct value of romantic love. The reason why ro-
mantic love is more in our control than parental love is because romantic love 
depends, at least in part, on a chosen relationship, the workings of which can be 
voluntarily altered by one or both of the partners. One cannot totally withdraw 
from a parent-child relationship; even if a child is given away at birth, her birth 
mother will always be her birth mother. On the other hand, a romantic relation-
ship requires voluntary commitment to the relationship by both partners. If one 
person no longer wants to be in the romantic relationship, then neither person 
can refer to herself as the other’s partner. As it is possible to end the romantic 
relationship, romantic love is, to an extent, conditional on the success of the re-
lationship. If one or both lovers stop working at the relationship, do not spend 
much time together, and stop being intimate with one another, then the rela-
tionship, and the love, will fall apart. Of course, we should work at our familial 
relationships as well, but familial love is far more likely to be unconditional, or 
nearly unconditional, than romantic love. This is partly because familial love is 
less voluntary than romantic love; families are bound to each other more tightly. 
They are necessarily bonded to one another in such a way that they may feel that 
their love is not a matter of choice. Romantic lovers are not bound to each other 
and know that either might stop loving the other at any point—even if they are 
married and very committed to one another. Nevertheless, this does not make 
romantic love less valuable than familial love. Having some control over whom 
you love romantically gives you greater control over your life, making you more 
likely to love someone who makes you happy. In addition, being loved by some-
one who could choose not to be in a relationship with you can be a greater boost 
to your self-esteem than being loved involuntarily by a family member. It also 
makes you more likely to treat them well. 
4. Conclusion
Following this examination of Frankfurt’s theory of love, I am in agreement 
with Foster in his rejection of Frankfurt’s claim that “there is really one kind 
of love which comes in degrees of purity.”63 Frankfurt tries to take agape and 
reformulate it so that it can also account for love of particular people. While he 
succeeds, to some extent, in describing parental love, he fails to accurately de-
scribe romantic love and friendship, and, moreover, overlooks what is distinctly 
valuable about them. Although it was not his intention to describe romantic love, 
by failing to include features such as reciprocity in his account of love, Frankfurt 
63 Foster, “Romantic Love and Knowledge,” 162.
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leaves no room for a kind of love that is important and valuable to many people. 
In addition, though they are not always easy to articulate, we do think that there 
are justifiable reasons to love some people and not others. There is a place for 
appraisal in romantic love and friendship.
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